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Abstract
The most prominent studies of cooperation in sociology proceed from some kind of rationality assumption. There are
basically two groups of studies, one starting from the assumption of rational egoism and the other starting from the
assumption of social rationality, in which other regard has a prominent place. The studies based on the assumption of
rational egoists are strongly inspired by (mostly game-theoretical) developments in economics and political science, but add
important sociological aspects to the analysis. Most important among these contributions are the dynamic analysis of
cooperation, the link between formal and informal institutions, and the importance of social networks for embedding
problematic transactions. Studies based on social rationality introduce assumptions on social preferences, learning, and
framing. Important questions concern the circumstances that strengthen or weaken social preferences, the evolution of signals
and conventions that govern trust, and the effects of goals on the definition of the situation. Studies using social rationality
are on the rise.
The most prominent studies of cooperation in sociology
proceed from some kind of rationality assumption. There are
basically two groups of studies, one starting from the
assumption of rational egoism and the other starting from the
assumption of social rationality, in which other regard has
a prominent place. The studies based on the assumption of
rational egoism are strongly inspired by (mostly game-theo-
retical) developments in economics and political science, but
add important sociological aspects to the analysis. Most
important among these contributions are the dynamic analysis
of cooperation, the link between formal and informal institu-
tions, and the importance of social networks for embedding
problematic transactions. Studies based on social rationality
introduce assumptions on social preferences, learning, and
framing. Important questions are those about the circum-
stances that strengthen or weaken social preferences, the
evolution of signals and conventions that govern trust, and the
effects of goals on the definition of the situation. Studies using
social rationality are on the rise.
Individuals cooperate if each willingly acts in a manner that
contributes to the other’s welfare. Cooperation is one of the
oldest and most revered topics in sociology, even though it has
appeared under a variety of headings, such as ‘social order’ and
‘solidarity.’ The classical sociological answers to the question of
how cooperation among individuals comes about differ in
detail but share a common core: Cooperation is the result of
shared values and norms and norm-conforming behavior.
A problem with this ‘obligation-centered’ solution is that
there is no explanation of where norms come from and why the
degree of norm conformity varies even for the same individual
over time. Theories that might solve these problems were not
developed until the 1970s, when a sea change in the basic
assumptions on human action took place within sociology. At
that time, analyses of cooperation among rational egoists
(mostly rooted in game theory) began to shed new light on
the way one might analyze cooperation, norms, and norm-
conforming behavior. For some time, game-theoretic analyses
of cooperation had become the most serious attempt to explain
cooperation. Big advances were made but many problems
remained, especially the problem that individuals do not seem
to be as self-centered as they are assumed to be in game theory.
Still, the game-theoretic analyses were powerful enough to
suggest that there was no way back to explanations of coop-
eration that ignored human rationality all together. More
recently, analyses based on some form of social rationality have
arisen in order to address some of the unsolved problems. The
following sections first present the most important aspects of
sociological research on cooperation among rational egoists,
and then discusses some contributions on cooperation with
social rationality.
Cooperation Among Rational Egoists
It may not be quite realistic to assume that individuals are
always looking out for themselves and that they do so by
weighing the costs and benefits of their behavior. However, this
assumption of ‘rational egoism’ seems to have four strong
points in its favor. First, it allows one to pinpoint why coop-
eration is an interesting problem. Second, it allows rigorous
theory formation with tractable structures of argumentation.
Third, everyday experience and research give this assumption
enough support to make it worthwhile to use it in the light of
its analytic advantages, especially when analyzing interaction
among interdependent individuals. Fourth, at later stages of
theory formation, this assumption can be relaxed in favor of
more realistic assumptions.
Game theory has furnished the most important instruments
for such analyses, and since the late 1970s – inspired by
developments in political science and economics – sociologists
have begun to use it to study questions concerning coopera-
tion, typically bringing sociological aspects into the analyses,
such as network embedding. The crucial first step in the ‘new’
analysis was to identify typical situations in which cooperation
is problematic: social dilemmas. A social dilemma is – roughly
speaking – a situation in which the rational decisions of
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individual actors are likely to lead to a collectively suboptimal
outcome. An outcome is suboptimal (i.e., not ‘Pareto-optimal’)
if one or more actors could improve their position without
worsening the position of any other actors. In a social dilemma,
individual and collective rationalities are in conflict. Coopera-
tion can now be succinctly defined: An actor cooperates if and
only if he or she chooses a course of action that will lead to
a collectively rational outcome when other actors behave
cooperatively as well. Social dilemmas occur when Pareto-
superior behavior cannot be achieved by enforceable contracts.
This may have many different reasons. For example, it may be
impossible to communicate with others in order to come to an
agreement; or, if communication is possible, transaction costs
may be too high to actually reach an agreement. If agreements
are within reach, it may be practically or epistemically impos-
sible to specify all relevant future contingencies in the contract.
Even if a contract can be drawn up, there may be no court with
sanctioning power; or if there is such a court, it may not be
possible to prove uncooperative behavior in court.
There are structurally different variants of social dilemmas,
and game theory helps to distinguish them. For example, there
is the common’s dilemma (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990) in
which various actors have free access to a resource (such as
fishers from different nations in international waters); there are
step-level public goods (Taylor, 1987), for which only a limited
number of actors have to cooperate in order to produce the
public good for a much larger group. A special case of this is the
volunteer’s dilemma (Diekmann, 1985), for which only one
volunteer is necessary to produce the public good for all, such
as rescuing a drowning child with a crowd of onlookers; there is
the trust game (Dasgupta, 1988) in which the trustee can honor
or opportunistically exploit the cooperation of the other (as
when you lendmoney to an acquaintance who promises to pay
it back with interest).
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is by far the best-known
variant of a social dilemma. It involves an arbitrarily large
number of people. The special case of a two-person PD has
been explored the best so far. In a two-person PD, both players
have the option to cooperate or to defect (Figure 1). If both
cooperate, each gets a payoff of value R. If one defects while the
other cooperates, the defector gets T and the cooperator gets
S. If both defect, both will get P, with T > R > P > S. There is a
dominant strategy for each player (i.e., an individually rational
choice, no matter what the other does) leading to a ‘Nash
equilibrium’ (in which no player can unilaterally improve his
or her position by deviating from the equilibrium strategy) and
to a Pareto-inferior result. The assumption of rational egoism
leads to two motives in a PD: the defensive motive to shield
against exploitation (if the other defects you are better off
defecting yourself), and the aggressive motive to exploit
a cooperative player (if the other cooperates, you get even more
by defecting). Together, these motive result in the conflict
between individual and collective rationality. Mutual cooper-
ation would be the Pareto-optimal result, but the two motives
lead to mutual defection.
The Embedding of Cooperation
Raub and Weesie (2000) have suggested that game-theoretic
work on solutions to social dilemmas can be divided into three
kinds of embeddings of potential cooperation: embedding in
time, in institutions, and in social networks. We follow their
suggestion for this overview.
Time
When actors find themselves in a social dilemma that is iter-
ated indefinitely over time, new sources for cooperation arise.
First of all, defection can be sanctioned by the other players in
later moves, and the resumption of cooperation by the
defector can be rewarded by a similar response of the other
players. Friedman (1977) and Taylor (1987) have shown that
if the value of future outcomes is high enough, this opportu-
nity to make one’s cooperation conditional on that of the
other leads to cooperative strategies with Nash equilibrium
and Pareto optimality. Axelrod (1984) built on this result to
ask the question of which strategy would be most conducive to
lead to cooperation in an iterated PD. In order to answer this
question, he conducted computer simulations in which
various strategies played against each other for about 200
rounds. Axelrod had invited suggestions for the strategies that
would create the most cooperation. The winner was the
conditional strategy ‘tit for tat’ (TFT) suggested by the math-
ematician and psychologist Anatol Rapoport who gained his
insight from early experimental studies with the repeated PD
(Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).
TFT is very simple: (1) always begin with cooperation; (2)
for the present round, copy the move of your partner in the
previous round. TFT has a number of distinct features. It is
‘nice,’ because it starts with cooperation; it cannot be provoked,
because it sanctions exploitation; and it is forgiving, because it
returns to cooperation after the other has done so. Contrast
this, for example, with ‘permanent retaliation’ in which defec-
tion is answered by unforgiving defection, a strategy that did
much worse than TFT. It does not do well against all sorts of
strategies and it does not respond optimally to mistakes that
might occur with small probability (Nowak, 2012).
The heart of Axelrod’s results, however, is thoroughly in
line with a classical sociological insight: that the norm of
reciprocity is probably the most essential norm generating
cooperation in time-embedded interactions. As sociologists
have argued for quite some time, homogeneity of a group in
terms of important characteristics (including the use of ‘nice’
strategies) will increase the likelihood of reciprocity, as does
smallness of the group because it helps identification of
defection. Similarly, a low rate of fluctuation of membership








Figure 1 Prisoner’s dilemma game. In the Axelrod simulation is T
(temptation) ¼ 5, R (reward) ¼ 3, P (punishment) ¼ 1, and S (sucker’s
payoff) ¼ 0.
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A related argument has been made in terms of ‘social capital’
(Coleman, 1990).
Axelrod’s tournament was based on the opportunity for
‘direct reciprocity’ among two actors. In larger groups, a system
of cooperation may emerge because of ‘indirect reciprocity.’ In
such a system A’s cooperative decision in favor of B is not
rewarded directly by B but by some other actor observing A’s
helpful act. Provided that cooperative acts increase an actor’s
reputation score, the possibility of indirect reciprocity leads,
under certain conditions, to a stable state of cooperation
(Nowak, 2012). Not formally proved systems of direct and
indirect reciprocity had already been explored by classical
sociologists and anthropologists decades ago (Blau, 1964), but
modern game theory and agent-based simulation methods
help to find out the conditions for the evolution and stability of
cooperative systems.
Institutions
When reciprocity norms work, they are self-enforcing because
no player can do better by unilaterally deviating from the
cooperative strategy (Nash equilibrium). However, under many
conditions, norms of reciprocity will not work properly. For
example, when future contingencies are so complex that it is
difficult to determine a priori what constitutes defection or
difficult to detect defection, a reciprocity norm is not enough to
secure cooperation. Similarly, such self-enforcing norms do not
work well for the production of collective goods in larger
groups, the less so themore inhomogeneous and fluctuating the
group membership. In such situations, expectations concerning
the relative importance of one’s own and others’ contribution
are likely to be low and individuals tend to free ride rather than
to contribute to the production of the collective good.
When self-enforcing norms donotwork, cooperationmaybe
achieved by embedding interactions in formal or informal rules
that create ‘selective incentives’; that is, added rewards for
cooperating and punishments for not cooperating. This argu-
ment was first forcefully made by Olson (1965) and has been
refined by sociologists and other social scientists (e.g., Hechter,
1987; Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Ostrom, 1990). For example,
the state punishes tax evasion and provides some standard
instruments for contracting; in many countries, labor unions
offer extra benefits (such as cheaper insurance) for joining the
labor union. The formation of institutional solutions has been
explainedbyHechter (1987) as a two-stage process. First, groups
for the joint production of private goods are established (such
as insurance). They are small enough that noncooperators can
be detected and excluded (hence no free rider problem). The
profits made from the joint production can then be used to
establish selective incentives for the joint production of collec-
tive goods. In this way, labor unions may emerge from mutual
insurance groups. Abell (1996) adds to this kind of analysis that
aproper institutional explanationof cooperation should include
the explanation of how cooperation can be combined with
rivalry and competition. More work in this direction is needed.
Williamson (1985) has pointed to the importance of
‘private orderings’ in which, in the shadow of the law, contract
partners may voluntarily restrict their own options, thereby
creating selective incentives for their own cooperative action.
For the partner, such measures work if there are ‘credible
commitments,’ for example, by posted hostages and granted
warranties. Sociologists have used this idea successfully to
study contractual behavior (e.g., Weesie et al., 1998).
Often, credible commitments are difficult to establish (due
to the size of the group) and formal institutional arrangements
(with enforced sanctions) may not be available. In such groups,
informal rules (social norms) that govern selective incentives for
cooperation are needed. Like all rules, informal rules work only
if they are enforced, and this creates the second-order free rider
problem. Sanctioning noncooperators is itself a (step-level)
collective good. There seems to be an infinite regress. How do
groups get out of this problem? There is no handy solution to
this problem within the rational egoistic approach, although
suggestions were put forward recently (Raihani and Bshary,
2011; Przepiorka and Diekmann, 2013). However, as Hecka-
thorn (1996), following Marwell and Oliver, has shown, public
good production is not always subject to the first- and second-
order free rider problems. In fact, the production function (i.e.,
the function that relates the proportion of cooperators to the
level of the public good production) is likely to be S-shaped and
only for certain values of the function will the situation have the
structure of a PD. The reason for this is that an S-shaped
production function implies a changing marginal utility from
cooperation as the proportion of cooperators increases. Inter-
estingly, Heckathorn also found that in certain phases ‘hypo-
critical cooperation,’ in which people criticize others for not
cooperating even though they do not cooperate themselves, is
quite effective in eliciting contributions to the collective good
(Yamagishi, 1986). The main lesson to be learned from
Heckathorn’s analysis is that collective action should be
analyzed dynamically, a conclusion one can also draw from
Hechter’s analysis of institutional controls mentioned above.
Social Networks
It has long been known in sociology that it often matters to
people what other people say about them. Cooperation is
helped by the effects of reputation within networks. For
example, DiMaggio and Louch (1998) found in a national
sample that consumers, when they are uncertain about prod-
ucts and performance, prefer to buy goods and services from
suppliers with whom they have social ties outside the trans-
action itself. If the suppliers in such a network are clearly
unreliable, the consumers are likely to have heard about it. If
these suppliers begin to be unreliable, the network relations
can be turned against them. Thus, networks have an informa-
tion function (people learn about the cooperativeness of
certain others) and a control function (people can use the
network to sanction noncooperators).
Both aspects have been worked out game-theoretically by
Buskens and Raub (2013). For dyadic transactions, character-
istics of the network (such as density, ‘indegree,’ and ‘out-
degree’; that is, the number of others with whom people are
connected) play an important role but it turns out that repu-
tation effects are quite complex and there are indications that
they might be less important than the temporal embeddedness.
For economic transactions, Uzzi (1996) has found interesting
additional effects of networks on tacit knowledge and joint
problem solving. Network embeddedness for collective action
has apparently not been studied yet in any rigorous way.
Yet another use of networks for the explanation of cooper-
ation has been suggested by Coleman (1990). He points to the
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importance of intermediaries for the creation of trust and thus
for cooperation. Intermediaries can play a number of roles: as
advisors who introduce interested parties and facilitate the
interaction necessary to create trust; as guarantors who absorb
the risk if trust turns out to be misplaced; and as entrepreneurs
who combine the resources of several actors to place them into
the hands of others who are expected to realize gains. For future
research, a sociologically interesting question is under what
conditions will structures with certain kinds of intermediaries
emerge.
Cooperation Among Socially Rational Individuals
There is a growing sociological literature on cooperation that
holds on to the assumption of rational action but adds specific
‘bridge theories’ on preferences, learning, and framing, the
effect of which is to render regard for others quite prominent in
the analyses. Rationality is seen as having evolved together with
the ability to derive adaptive advantages from living in groups
(Dunbar, 2003). Hence the term social rationality. Preferences
are likely to have been influenced by this process, and the social
influence on cognitive and motivational processes may even
create situationally different kinds of rationality. In this litera-
ture the trade-off between empirical richness and analytical
tractability is different than in most game-theoretic analyses. In
the latter, added analytical power and tractability is often
achieved by the rational egoist assumption at the expense of
some loss in closeness to reality, whereas in the former, some
analytical power and tractability is sacrificed in favor of added
closeness to reality. Clearly, each kind of approach profits from
the existence of the other. In this review, there remains room
for the discussion of only a few developments.
Goals (Preferences)
By far the largest amount of literature on cooperation in the
‘social rationality’ category is concerned with ‘social prefer-
ences.’ Although the term preference is often used in this
context, a better term would be ‘social goals.’ One variant of
this approach, found in social-psychological and sociological
research, is ‘social orientation’ research, in which individuals
are differentiated according to their orientation toward others.
This orientation is often assumed to be more or less stable and
the joint result of nature and nurture. Different types of
orientation are distinguished, most frequently the following
three: ‘cooperative’ (the goal is to maximize joint payoffs);
‘individualistic’ (the goal is to maximize individual payoff);
and ‘competitive’ (the goal is to maximize the positive differ-
ence between own and other’s payoff). Such ‘types’ can be
combined with game-theoretic analyses or with analyses of
evolutionary learning at the population level.
A related but different approach emphasizes that human
beings have evolved to have (pro)social goals that make them
dependent on others and thus willing to cooperate for a variety
of reasons. This concerns mainly the value of status (leading to
cooperation by the strategic adaptation to authority relations,
or to lack of cooperation due to status competition), the value
of behavioral confirmation (leading to cooperation on the
basis of conformity to peers’ expectations), and the value of
affection (leading to cooperation on the basis of liking) (Lin-
denberg and Frey, 1993).
Importantly, cooperation also depends on negative goals,
especially the desire to punish noncooperators. An influential
experiment by Fehr and Gächter (2002) demonstrates that
subjects punish free riders in collective good situations even if
sanctioning is costly. This type of behavior is called ‘altruistic
reciprocity.’ Actors pay a price for negatively reciprocating to
noncooperative behavior, thereby sustaining cooperation in
a public good situation. Having the choice between a regime
with sanction-free and sanctioning institutions in a collective
good situation, most subjects chose the former in the begin-
ning. However, after the breakdown of cooperation under the
sanction-free regime, subjects increasingly change to the alter-
native regime. This experiment by Gürerk et al. (2006) exhibits
that sanctioning institutions solving the problem of coopera-
tion emerge in a dynamic, evolutionary process. Yet, on
a societal level, the willingness to engage in costly punishing
varies considerably among different cultures and countries
(Henrich et al., 2006).
Sociologists and economists who focus on different types of
people (in terms of orientation) are especially concerned with
questions of signaling and the spread of strategies over time,
some of them using genetic algorithms taken from evolu-
tionary biology. This makes trust a central concept in the
analysis of cooperation. For example: “Are the tendencies to
trust and to honor trust correlated?” (Snijders, 1996); “How
can cooperative types convincingly signal their type to others so
that they will be trusted and cooperation comes about?”
(Posner, 2000). Or “Under what conditions will effective rules
for trusting (i.e., conventions for detecting cooperators) evolve
in neighborhood interactions and spread across the population
through contact with strangers?” (Macy and Skvoretz, 1998).
One problem with this concept of social orientation is that it
does not allow for situational influences on preferences and
cognitions. Could not there be situations in which one is
prosocial and others in which one would be quite egoistic?
Framing Effects
The willingness to cooperate seems also to depend on how
people define a situation. Of particular importance is the
difference between gains and losses. Kahneman and Tversky
have shown that individuals are keener on avoiding losses than
on achieving gains, ceteris paribus. This leads to the hypothesis
that it is easier to bring about cooperation concerning the
defense of a common pool resource than the achievement of
a (new) public good. For example, it should be easier to bring
about a campaign to preserve a rainforest than a campaign to
create a wildlife preserve. The evidence for this is somewhat
mixed (Van Assen, 1999), but when the disturbing effects are
carefully controlled, the framing prediction finds support,
especially for initial stages of cooperation (Sell and Son, 1997).
There is also a claim that people often cognitively transform
a PD into a game with conditional cooperation (assurance
game). The interesting question then is how the beliefs that
others will cooperate are influenced by social circumstances or
by cultural beliefs (Hayashi et al., 1999), and what influence
certain thresholds of cooperation have for triggering condi-
tional cooperation in a larger group (Yamaguchi, 2000).
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A different framing effect comes from ‘goal framing’ (Lin-
denberg and Steg, 2007). Overarching goals have a strong
impact on the way individuals define a situation and thereby
create a difference between ‘foreground’ and ‘background’
information and preferences. What is in the foreground will
have a much stronger impact on behavior than what is in the
background, ceteris paribus. For example, if the overarching goal
(the goal frame) ‘to act appropriately’ is salient, then infor-
mation on normative expectations and ways to meet them are
in the foreground and in the center of attention, whereas the
overarching gain goal ‘to increase and guard one’s resources’ is
in the background. As a result, when the goal-frame is
normative (i.e., the goal to act appropriately is salient), orien-
tation toward common goals and norms is focal and costs of
cooperation are much less prominently perceived. Costs of
cooperation must then be much larger in order to reduce
people’s willingness to cooperate than when gain itself is the
goal frame. Sociologically, an important feature of overarching
goals is that people are likely to signal their goal-frame to
others through their behavior (e.g., through ‘relational
signals’), creating contagion effects that make (non)coopera-
tion spread. The cooperative orientation linked to the norma-
tive goal-frame seems to be triggered especially when others
show concern for norms and also when the situation is clearly
one of reaching a common goal (‘joint production,’ Lindenberg
and Foss, 2011). Group identity processes also play an
important role (Simpson and Macy, 2004). All this puts a high
premium on including cues that signal goal-frames (promi-
nently including symbolic behavior) in the analyses of coop-
eration, even in game-theoretic analyses, and in the analysis of
how institutions work to foster cooperation.
All in all, in sociology, studies on cooperation are both
based on the assumption of rational egoists and on some kind
of social rationality. The latter are clearly on the rise in number
and sophistication.
See also: Affect-Regulation Motivation; Cooperation and
Competition; Decision and Choice: Bounded Rationality;
Dispute Resolutions in Economics; Emotions, Sociology of;
Game Theory: Noncooperative Games; Game Theory; Groups,
Sociology of; Institutions; Network Analysis; Norms;
Organizational Decision Making; Organizations, Sociology of;
Prisoner’s Dilemma, One Shot and Iterated; Psychoanalysis in
Sociology; Rationality in Society; Social Relationships in
Adulthood; Solidarity, Sociology of; Trust, Sociology of.
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